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All Bound Up With No Place to Go:
A Lack of Individual Alternatives to
Binding Arbitration Provisions for
Statutory Claims
Tewolde v. Owens & Minor Distribution, Inc.'
I. INTRODUCTION
For the greater part of the twentieth century, arbitration has played a large
role in resolving disputes between unions representing employees and employers.2
However, during the past few decades, these employment contracts began to in-
corporate mandatory arbitration agreements for statutory discrimination claims,
with at least one-fifth of all employees presently subject to mandatory arbitration.3
During this same period, courts began to broaden the ability of employees to
waive their right to a judicial forum for statutory claims4; Tewolde v. Owens &
Minor Distribution is no exception. In 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled for the
first time that a union may waive, under a collective bargaining agreement, an
individual employee's right to a judicial forum for statutory claims.' The purpose
of this note is to examine the unprecedented expansion of the employees' ability
to waive their right to a judicial forum for statutory claims by the U.S. District
Court for the District of Minnesota.6
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
On October 13, 2003, Mesfin Tewolde (Tewolde), a native of Eritrea, began
his employment as a "material handler" on the night shift for Owens & Minor
Distribution, Inc. (Owens & Minor).7  After a ninety-day probationary period,
Marc Johnson (Johnson), the general manager for Owens & Minor, told another
employee he really liked Tewolde and that he was going to permanently hire him.8
As a result of his employment, Tewolde became a member of Minnesota's Health
1. Civil No. 07-4075, 2009 WL 1653533 (Dist. Minn. 2009)
2. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Employment Discrimination Claims: Do You Really Have To?
Do You Really Want To?, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 255, 256-62 (1994); see also Suzette M. Malveaux, Is it
the "Real Thing"? How Coke's One-Way Binding Arbitration May Bridge the Divide Between Litiga-
tion and Arbitration, 2009 J. DiSP. RESOL. 77 (discussing the increase in arbitration under the FAA).
3. Malveaux, supra note 2, at 80-82.
4. See generally Ellwood F. Oakley III & Donald 0. Mayer, Arbitration of Employment Discrimi-
nation Claims and the Challenge of Contemporary Federalism, 47 S.C. L. REV. 475,477-78 (1996).
5. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
6. See Tewolde, 2009 WL 1653533.
7. Id. at *1.
8. Id. at *3. This message was relayed to Tewolde through Julkowski, the warehouse manager. Id.
Julkowski told Tewolde, that even though Julkowski did not personally like Tewolde, Johnson was
going to hire him anyway. Id.
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Care Union Local 113 SEIU (Union).9 The Union maintained a collective bar-
gaining agreement (CBA) with Owens & Minor, which contained a provision
subjecting disputes between the Union and Owens & Minor to arbitration.' 0
Shortly after being hired, in January 2004, Tewolde applied for a lead materi-
al handler position." Steve Julkowski (Julkowski), the warehouse manager for
Owens & Minor, approached more senior employees for the position, mentioning
that there had been problems with Tewolde's performance and English language
skills.12 Tewolde then filed complaints with Owens & Minor's human resources
department, alleging that he had been subject to discrimination "based on his cul-
ture, ethnicity and English-speaking capabilities."' 3
Not long after filing his complaint, Tewolde was disciplined by Julkowski for
poor work performance.14 Johnson then informed Tewolde that he had not been
on the job for the necessary 120 days and did not possess the necessary skills for
the lead position. 5 Further, Johnson informed Tewolde that his discrimination
charges were found to have no merit.'6
An opening for the lead position was again posted in May 2004.17 Tewolde
and another employee applied for the position, but the other employee was cho-
sen. Shortly thereafter, Tewolde filed a grievance with the Union and the Min-
nesota Department of Human Rights (MDHR), alleging that he had not been cho-
sen for the position as a result of his national origin.19
On May 2, 2005, Tewolde was terminated allegedly as a result of low produc-
tivity and a refusal to follow safety guidelines.20 Tewolde again filed a grievance
for national origin discrimination with the Union and a second grievance with the
MDHR, for retaliation.21 Ruling on both grievances, the MDHR determined that
there was probable cause of discrimination by Owens & Minor. 22 However, each
arbitrator ruling on the May 2004 and May 2005 grievances found that Tewolde
suffered from low productivity and a high error rate; thus his grievances were
denied and the arbitrator found his termination supported by just cause. 23
Tewolde then filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minneso-
ta, alleging discrimination based on national origin in violation of the Minnesota
9. Id. at *2. The Union maintained a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Owens & Minor.
Id.
10. Id. at *4-*5. Further, "the CBA provided that there 'shall be no discrimination by the Union or
[Owens & Minor] against any employee because of membership or non-membership in the Union or
because of the assertion of rights afforded by this Agreement."' Id. at *2.





15. Id. Around this time, Johnson mentioned to Julkowski, that Tewolde "had turned out to be not a
very good employee." Id.
16. Id.




21. Id. at *5.
22. Id. Tewolde also filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC),
and as a result, received a right to sue letter. Id. at *6.
23. Id. at *5.
190 [Vol. 2010
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Human Rights Act (MHRA) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.24 Te-
wolde argued that he was qualified for the lead position and was not terminated
25for just cause. Owens & Minor asserted that the decision by the arbitrator prec-
luded Tewolde from filing suit in court, and thus Owens & Minor moved for
summary judgment.26 The court granted Owens & Minor's motion for summary
judgment 27 and held that a court will give the arbitrator's decision of a contractual
claim "an extraordinary level of deference" in a subsequent Title VII action, and
will uphold the decision when the arbitrator is acting within their scope of authori-
ty under the CBA.28
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Title VII was enacted by Congress as a part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.29
Title VII explicitly states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to dis-
charge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin.30
Initially, Title VII was silent on whether a judicial forum could be waived.3 '
However, this changed with the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (Act). 32 The Act pro-
vided that, "[wihere appropriate and to the extent authorized by law, the use of
alternative means of dispute resolution, including settlement negotiations, concili-
ation, facilitation, mediation, factfinding, minitrials, and arbitration, is encouraged
to resolve disputes arising under" Title VII and various other provisions of federal
law. 33 Conversely, the Act also provided that individuals may demand a trial by
jury when seeking compensatory or punitive damages. 34
In light of these conflicting provisions, two congressional committees sought
to clarify Congress' intentions. 35 The House Committee on Education and Labor
established that the use of the ADR section in the Act was "intended to supple-
24. Id. at *6.
25. Id. at *7.
26. Id.
27. Id. at *10. The court however denied part of the motion, because a factual inference of discrimi-
nation could be drawn from the fact of the relative short time period between Tewolde filing his com-
plaint with Owens & Minor's human resources department and his subsequent reprimand by Julkows-
ki. Id. at *11.
28. Id. at *9.
29. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2000e- 15 (2006)).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l).
31. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15.
32. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006).
33. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a(c).
35. The two committees being the House Committee on Education and Labor and the House Judi-
ciary Committee. Oakley & Mayer, supra note 4, at 489.
No. 1] I 91
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ment, not supplant, the remedies provided by Title VII." 36 Moreover, the Com-
mittee maintained that agreeing to arbitration does not preclude the individual
from seeking relief under Title VII. 37
Additionally, the House Judiciary Committee stated in its report that it did
"not intend for the inclusion of this section to be used to preclude rights and re-
medies that would otherwise be available."38 However, these two committee re-
ports did not establish the intent of the full Congress, as no report on behalf of all
of Congress was prepared.39  These reports merely offered a hint at Congress'
intentions behind the ADR provision in the Act-intentions that still are not clear
and have been the basis for much litigation.
A. Gardner-Denver: Limiting Arbitration of Statutory Claims
In reference to mandatory employment arbitration agreements for Title VII
discrimination claims, the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.
ruled that under Title VII, "an individual does not forfeit his private cause of ac-
tion if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under the nondiscrimina-
tion clause of a collective-bargaining agreement." 40 In Gardner-Denver, an em-
ployee filed suit under Title VII for racial discrimination after he had previously
arbitrated the claim under a general arbitration clause contained in the CBA.4 1
In ruling that the subsequent civil claim was not precluded, the Court recog-
nized that there are contractual rights under a CBA and independent statutory
rights afforded by Congress, such as Title VII, which are both enforceable by
42plaintiff-employees. Moreover, the Court stated that, even though a party may
waive its statutory rights to bring a Title VII claim in court as a part of a settle-
ment agreement, "there can be no prospective waiver of an employee's rights
under Title VII."43
Additionally, the Court was skeptical of an arbitrator's statutory knowledge,
as it said that an arbitrator typically deals with the "industrial common law of the
shop" and serves only the parties in a system of self-government under a CBA.4
36. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 97 (1991). "The Committee does not intend this section to be
used to preclude rights and remedies that would otherwise be available." Id.
37. Id. However, the committee did not make clear if the "rights and remedies" in reference were the
substantive rights under Title VII or a right to a trial by jury in a judicial forum. See Oakley, III &
Mayer, supra note 4, at 490.
38. H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 97.
39. See Oakley & Mayer, supra note 4, at 489-90.
40. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 49 (1974); see also Varner v. Nat'l Super Mkts.,
Inc., 94 F.3d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1996) (finding absolute right to adjudicate suits under Title VII
despite binding arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement).
41. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 43.
42. Id. at 49-50.
43. Id. at 51; see also, Richardson v. Sugg, 448 F.3d 1046, 1055 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that em-
ployee could not waive prospective claims under Title VII).
44. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 53; see also McDonald v. City of West Branch,, 466 U.S. 284, 290
(1984) ("[arbitration] cannot provide an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting
[federal statutory rights]"); Harry Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV.
L. REV. 999, 1016 (1955) ("He has no general charter to administer justice for a community which
transcends the parties. He is rather part of a system of self-government created by and confined to the
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Furthermore, arbitrators do not abide by traditional rules of evidence, and the
usual trial procedures such as cross-examination, subpoenas, and testimony under
oath are often scaled back or sometimes not even used.45 Further, when granting
an award, an arbitrator does not have to give the reason.4 Because of these in-
formalities, the Court concluded that while arbitration is an "inexpensive and ex-
peditious means" of dispute resolution, it is unsuited for the resolution of Title VII
claims. 47 However, the Court noted that a prior arbitration decision may be admit-
ted as evidence during the subsequent judicial proceeding. 48
Furthermore, the Court found that the individual interests may be suppressed
by the collective interests of the union.49 And, even though an individual could
claim that the union breached its duty of fair representation, such a breach is often
difficult to prove.50
The Court expanded on this concern of individual interests being swallowed
up by the collective interests of the union in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
System, Inc.51 In this case, the employees filed a grievance with the union, alleg-
ing that they were not being fairly compensated by the company. 52 After the arbi-
trator rejected their claim, the employees filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA), and they also alleged that the union violated its duty of fair represen-
tation.53 In ruling that the arbitration did not preclude the subsequent civil claim,
the Court noted that a union may "decide not to support the claim vi orously" for
a variety of reasons without breaching its duty of fair representation. Moreover,
45. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57-58; see also Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S.
198, 203 (1956) (expressing concern relating to the procedural differences between arbitration and
litigation).
46. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car
Corp., 363 U.S 593, 598 (1960)).
47. Id.
48. Id. at 60. The Court stated that the weight given to the decision will be determined by a variety
of factors such as: whether the provision in the CBA closely conforms to the statute; "the degree of
procedural fairness in the arbitral forum;" the sufficiency of the record pertaining to discrimination;
and the capability of particular arbitrators. Id. at 60, n.21. However, such weighing of prior arbitration
decisions should not take place in summary judgment, as the court may not "place the parties' compet-
ing evidence in a balance scale when deciding whether to grant summary judgment." Bell v. Conopco,
Inc., 186 F.3d 1099, 1102 (8th Cir. 1999).
49. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19; see also J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 337-39
(1944) ("The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the
terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining power
and serve the welfare of the group."); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 291 (1984)
("The union's interests and those of the individual employee are not always identical.... As a result,
the union may present the employee's grievance less vigorously, or make different strategic choices,
than would the employee.").
50. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19; see, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967); Humphrey
v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342, 348-351 (1964). Moreover, Congress thought it was necessary to protect
employees under Title VII not just from employers, but from unions as well. Gardner-Denver, 415
U.S. at 58.
51. 450 U.S. 728 (1981).
52. Id. at 730-31.
53. Id. at 731-33.
54. Id. at 742. See also McDonald, 466 U.S. at 291 ("[W]ere an arbitration award accorded preclu-
sive effect, an employee's opportunity to be compensated for a constitutional deprivation might be lost
merely because it was not in the union's interest to press his claim vigorously.").
No. 1] 193
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the Court also found that the goal of a union is to maximize compensation for all,
not just one employee.55
Further, the Court continued to be skeptical of the arbitrability of statutory
claims when it echoed Gardner-Denver and stated that arbitrators deal mostly
with "the law of the shop, not the law of the land."56 Moreover, the Court noted
that at the time the case was decided, many arbitrators were not even attorneys.
Additionally, an award given by the arbitrator would normally be limited by the
language of the CBA, and it would be highly unlikely that an arbitrator would
award "liquidated damages, costs, or attorney's fees."58
Likewise, in McDonald v. City of West Branch,59 a factually similar case to
60Tewolde, the Court found that arbitration decisions are not judicial proceedings
and therefore a court need not give "full faith and credit" to these decisions.
Additionally, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota has found that
"affording preclusive effect to arbitration decisions has the potential to undermine
the Congressional intent of employee-protection statutes." 62
B. The Tide Turns: Expanding the Ability to Arbitrate Statutory Claims
Beginning with Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
the Court began to reconsider the legality of mandatory arbitration agreements of
discrimination claims and lifted many of the limitations that it had previously
placed on such claims. Revisiting earlier skepticism of the arbitral process, such
as that mentioned in Barrentine, the Court asserted that "we are well past the time
when judicial suspicion . .. of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbi-
trations as an alternative means of dispute resolution."
The Court further expanded on this view in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corp., where it found that in order to gain the informality and simplicity of arbi-
tration, a party could freely trade "the procedure and opportunity for review"
55. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 742 (citing Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58).
56. Id. at 743 (quoting Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57).
57. Id.(citing Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 57); see also McDonald, 466 U.S. at 290 n.9 ("[Miany
arbitrators are not lawyers."); Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) ("The
change from a court of law to an arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ultimate result ....
Arbitrators do not have the benefit of judicial instruction on the law.").
58. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 745; see also United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enter. Wheel & Car Corp.,
363 U.S 593, 597 (1960) ([An arbitrator's] "award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence
from the collective bargaining agreement.").
59. 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
60. In McDonald, the plaintiff was discharged from his job and subsequently filed a grievance with
the union arguing that he was fired without just cause. Id. at 285-86. The arbitrator found for the em-
ployer and instead of appealing the arbitrator's decision, the plaintiff filed suit against multiple defen-
dants in federal district court. Id. at 286. At trial, the jury ruled in the plaintiffs favor against one of
the defendants. Id.
61. Id. at 288. "[Jludicial proceedings [of any court of any State] shall have the same full faith and
credit in every court within the United States and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or
usage in the courts of such State . . . from which they are taken." Id. at 288-89. (quoting 28 U.S.C. §
1738 (2006)).
62. Dillaway v. Ferrante, No. Civ. 02-715 (JRT/JSM), 2003 WL 23109696, at *7 (Dist. Minn. Dec.
9, 2003).
63. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
64. Id. at 626-27.
[Vol. 2010194
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available in a judicial setting.65 Even though judicial review of arbitration awards
is limited, the Court found that the review procedure is still "sufficient to ensure
that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute."66 In addition, the
Court found it unlikely that an age discrimination claim required more discovery
than other arbitrable claims. 67 Therefore, even with limited discovery in the arbi-
tral setting, a party could still prove discrimination. 68
Furthermore, the Court in Gilmer argued a matter that would become a much
larger theme in subsequent cases: that "by agreeing to arbitrate .... a party does
not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum."69 Additionally, if a party
later seeks to sue in court after that party had already waived its statutory right to a
judicial forum, that party must establish that Congress intended that statutory right
to be unwaivable. 70
Most importantly, the Court held that the Gardner-Denver line of casesn did
not apply to its decision for several reasons.72 First, those cases involved parties
who did not explicitly waive their statutory rights to bring a claim in a judicial
forum.73  Second, the Court noted those cases involved a CBA where the em-
ployee was represented by a union, and there was a concern between "collective
representation and individual statutory rights." 74 Neither of these reasons applied
in Gilmer because the agreement clearly waived the employees' statutory right to
a judicial forum.75 Further, the case involved no tension between collective repre-
sentation and individual rights, as the employee did not belong to a union.76
The Court further hinted at the direction of its future decisions with Wright v.
Universal Maritime Serv. Corp.77 In Wright, an employee filed suit against the
company under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) without first arbitrat-
ing the claim under the CBA. A unanimous Court found that the suit was not
65. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 31 (1991) (citing Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at
628). Gilmer was decided under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Id. at 23. The
individual employee not operating under a CBA explicitly agreed to arbitrate his statutory claims. Id.
at 35.
66. Id. at 32 n.4 (citing Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232 (1987)).
67. Id. at 31.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
(1985)); see also, Richardson v. Sugg, 448 F.3d 1046, 1055 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding that "so long as
some forum is available to hear prospective claims, civil rights statutes are not violated") (emphasis in
original).
70. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; see also, 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1465 (2009)
(finding that legislative history need not be examined when the statutory text is clear).
71. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36 (1974); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.,
Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981); McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).




76. Id. A third reason was that the Gardner-Denver line of cases were not decided under the FAA,
which features a more "liberal policy favoring arbitration agreements." Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985)).
77. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
78. Id. at 74-75.
195No. 1]
7
Gierse: Gierse: All Bound up with No Place to Go
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
precluded because the CBA did not contain an explicit waiver7 9 of an employee's
right to bring a statutory discrimination claim in a federal forum; any CBA re-
quirement to arbitrate these claims "must be clear and unmistakable."80
Since the Court found no waiver occurred, the Court refused to "resolve the
question of the validity of a[n explicit] union-negotiated waiver."81 However, the
Court, for the time being, did leave open the question of whether Gardner-Denver
would survive Gilmer, but it noted that Gardner-Denver was at least important
enough to protect an employee's right to a judicial forum "against [a] less-than-
explicit union waiver in a CBA."82
The Court finally resolved the question of the validity of an explicit union
waiver in a CBA in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett.83 Unlike Wright, the CBA in
Penn Plaza contained an explicit waiver of the employees' statutory right to a
federal forum for discrimination claims when the union agreed in the CBA to
arbitrate these claims. 84 In a closely divided court, the majority declared that "a
collective-bargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires union
members to arbitrate [Age Discrimination in Employment Act] claims is enforce-
able."85
Moreover, the Court found that the agreed-upon decision to arbitrate "em-
ployment-discrimination claims is no different from the many other decisions
made by parties in designing grievance machinery."86 The Court noted that a
union most likely would agree to such language as a result of concessions from
the employer and nullifying such concessions during this "bargained for ex-
79. The CBA generally stated that "[iut is the intention and purpose of all parties hereto that no
provision or part of this Agreement shall be violative of any Federal or State Law." Id. at 73.
80. Id. at 80, 82; see also Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107, 125 (1994) ("[A] waiver that would
have to be 'clear and unmistakable'); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409 n.9
(1988) ("[W]e would require 'clear and unmistakable' evidence ... in order to conclude that such a
waiver had been intended."); Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 708 (1983) ("[W]e will not
infer from a general contractual provision that the parties intended to waive a statutorily protected right
unless the undertaking is 'explicitly stated.' More succinctly, the waiver must be clear and unmistaka-
ble.").
81. Wright, 525 U.S. at 77.
82. Id. at 80 (emphasis added). The CBA in Wright did not contain an agreement that specifically
incorporated antidiscrimination statutes. Id. The CBA merely contained a clause that stated that all
"matters under dispute" would be subject to arbitration, which the court determined was hardly "clear
and unmistakable." Id.
83. 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009).
84. Id. at 1461. The CBA provided that
"[tihere shall be no discrimination against any present or future employee by reason of race,
creed, color, age, disability, national origin, sex, union membership, or any other characteristic
protected by law, including, but not limited to, claims made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the
New York State Human Rights Law, the New York City Human Rights Code, . . . or any other
similar laws, rules, or regulations. All such claims shall be subject to the grievance and arbitra-
tion procedures."
Id.
85. Id. at 1474.
86. Id. at 1464; see Litton Fin. Printing Div., Litton Bus. Sys., Inc. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 199
(1991); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960)
("[Airbitration of labor disputes under collective bargaining agreements is part and parcel of the col-
lective bargaining process itself.").
196 [Vol. 2010
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change" would be contrary to "one of the fundamental policies of the National
Labor Relations Act-freedom of contract."87
The Court differentiated its opinion from the Gardner-Denver line of cases,
and in so doing, severely limited the scope of the holding in those cases. The
Court determined that the holding in Gardner-Denver was simply that "arbitration
of contract-based claims [did not preclude] subsequent judicial resolution of statu-
tory claims" when there was a less-than-explicit agreement to arbitrate the statuto-
ry claims.88 Further, the Court found that the key distinction between Gilmer and
Gardner-Denver was not that the agreement was signed by an individual em-
ployee or a union, but that the employee in Gilmer explicitly agreed to arbitrate
statutory discrimination claims, whereas the employees in Gardner-Denver did
not.89 Therefore, the Court determined that the Gardner-Denver line of cases did
not apply when there was an explicit "agreement to arbitrate statutory claims."9o
The Court then undercut another basis of Gardner-Denver's holding when it
stated that "there is 'no reason to color the lens through which the arbitration
clause is read' simply because" an individual's interest may be suppressed by the
collective interest of the union.91 If a union member feels his claim has been ad-
vocated "less than vigorous[ly,]" he may file a claim against the union for failing
its duty of fair representation. 92 If employees want to assert their individual statu-
tory rights, they may do so by filing discrimination claims with the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) or the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), who may then file suit on behalf of the individual. 93
Tewolde, as of this writing, is the most recent case to discuss the issue of a
less-than-explicit waiver of an employee's right to a judicial forum, and it threat-
ens what little remains of Gardner-Denver, as the court decided the issue of
87. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1464 (quoting NLRB v. Magnavox Co., 415 U.S. 322, 328 (1974)
(Stewart, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
88. Id. at 1468 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991)). The Court
found that it was long past "judicial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration" and that the mistrust of
the arbitral process, which was discussed at length in Gardner-Denver, forced the Court to thus limit
its scope to only its core holding. Id. at 1470. Further, the Court determined that Gardner-Denver had
"erroneously assumed" that one waived their substantive statutory rights when agreeing to arbitrate
those statutory claims and that Gardner-Denver had a "distorted understanding of the compromise
made when an employee agrees to compulsory arbitration." Id. at 1469-70.
89. See id. at 1465. Additionally, the Court virtually ignored half of the basis for its holding in
Gilmer when it stated that the law only required that "an agreement to arbitrate statutory antidiscrimi-
nation claims be 'explicitly stated' in the collective-bargaining agreement. Id. (citing Wright v. Uni-
versal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 80 (1998)). See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,
500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991).
90. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. CL at 1468-69. Since the Court so limited Gardner-Denver's scope and
found that it did not control, the Court asserted that the principals of stare decisis were not violated. Id.
at 1469. However, if Gardner-Denver's holding were any broader, the Court determined that it would
then "be a strong candidate for overruling." Id. at 1469 n.8.
91. Id. at 1472 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614,
628 (1991)).
92. Id. at 1473; see, e.g., Marquez v. Screen Actors Guild, Inc., 525 U.S. 33,44 (1998).
93. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1473; see also EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 295-296
(2002). The Court did not shut the door completely on arguing that one waives their substantive rights
under a statute by agreeing to arbitrate these claims, when it left the issue unanswered that arbitration
agreements in a CBA do act as a substantive waiver, as employees not only are prohibited from bring-
ing an individual claim, but that a union may block arbitration of those claims as well. 14 Penn Plaza,
129 S. CL at 1474.
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whether a less-than-explicit agreement to arbitrate statutory claims precluded a
subsequent civil claim in a judicial forum.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Tewolde, the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota ruled that the
arbitrator acted within the scope of the CBA; therefore, the court deferred to the
arbitrator's ruling, which found that Owens & Minor did not discriminate against
Tewolde on the basis of his national origin.94 The court began by noting that it is
clear that an agreement to arbitrate statutory claims must be explicit, and a subse-
quent civil claim will be not be precluded by an arbitrator's decision if there was
no explicit waiver in the CBA. However, the court stated that it was unclear
whether the arbitration of a contractual claim would bar a subsequent statutory
discrimination claim in the Eighth Circuit. 96
For the proposition that an employee's right to a judicial forum cannot be
waived, the court relied on a case from the Sixth Circuit, Nance v. Goodyear Tire
& Rubber Co.,97 which heavily cited to Gardner-Denver. However, the court
noted that Penn Plaza undercut much of Gardner-Denver and, therefore, Nance
no longer applied, and an arbitrator's prior ruling interpreting the CBA must be
given "an extraordinary level of deference."98
Additionally, by quoting Penn Plaza and Gilmer, the court adopted the rule
that agreeing to arbitrate statutory claims does not waive an employee's right to be
free from discrimination; it merely changes the forum for bringing the claim.99
Moreover, the court further quoted Penn Plaza and Gilmer when it stated that the
procedures associated with arbitration were not insufficient to protect an em-
ployee's right to bring a claim of discrimination. 1  Additionally, the court con-
tinued to reference Penn Plaza when it broadly stated that there was no weight to
the claim that an employee's individual rights would be suppressed by the collec-
tive interests of the union.10
Further, the court determined that extreme deference should be given to an
arbitral decision that interprets a CBA that explicitly references federal discrimi-
nation statutes.102 Such decisions would still be subject to judicial review. 0 3
However, the scope of such review would be very limited. 1(
94. Tewolde v. Owens & Minor Distr. Inc., Civil No. 07-4075, 2009 WL 1653533 at *10.
95. See id. at *7 (citing Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 837 (8th Cir. 1997)); see
also Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 39; Bell, 186 F.3d at 1101.
96. See Tewolde, 2009 WL 1653533 at *7.
97. 527 F.3d 539 (6th Cir. 2008).
98. Tewolde, 2009 WL 1653533, at *9 (quoting Crawford Group, Inc. v. Holekamp, 543 F.3d 971,
976 (8th Cir. 2008)).
99. See id. (quoting 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett LLC, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469 (2009)) ("The decision to
resolve ADEA claims by way of arbitration instead of litigation does not waive the statutory right to be
free from workplace age discrimination; it waives only the right to seek relief from a court in the first
instance.").
100. Id. (citing 14 Penn Plaza,129 S. Ct. at 1471).
101. Id. (citing 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1472).
102. Id. (citing 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1471 n.10).
103. See id.
104. Id. A decision will generally be overturned where there is evidence of fraud, corruption, or
undue means. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006).
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In deferring to the arbitrator's decision, the court determined that Tewolde
was not qualified for the lead position and that he could not provide enough evi-
dence to establish a prima facie case of national origin discrimination.' 05 Howev-
er, the court did find a prima facie case of retaliation, given the proximity of Te-
wolde's complaint with human resources to his disciplinary action from Julkows-
ki, which occurred the very next day.10
The court concluded that it will defer to an arbitrator's previous decision on a
contractual claim in a subsequent Title VII action and will uphold the arbitrator's
decision when the arbitrator is arguably acting within their scope of authority
under the CBA. 07
V. COMMENT
Tewolde signifies a considerable step in a long line of cases affirming an em-
ployee's ability in an employment contract to waive the right to a judicial forum
for statutory discrimination claims.1os But this step is unwarranted. The court
correctly noted that the waiver of an employee's right to file a civil claim must be
explicit.' Nonetheless, the court neglected to apply this rule to the facts at hand.
Instead, the court was caught up in the Supreme Court's recent decision in Penn
Plaza."0
Nothing in the court's opinion supports the proposition that Tewolde's right
to bring a civil claim was explicitly waived by the Union."' The only clause of
the CBA mentioned by the court that resembles an explicit waiver is a clause gen-
erally providing that there "shall be no discrimination by the Union or [Owens &
Minor] against any employee because of membership ... in the Union or because
of the assertion of rights afforded by this Agreement."" 2
This hardly follows Penn Plaza, where the provision that explicitly waived an
employee's right to a judicial forum specifically incorporated statutory law.113 To
the contrary, this agreement clearly falls under Penn Plaza's narrowed interpreta-
tion of Gardner-Denver, where the "arbitration of contract-based claims [does not
preclude] subsequent judicial resolution of statutory claims" when there was a
less-than-explicit agreement to arbitrate the statutory claims.114 The court in Te-
105. Tewolde, 2009 WL 1653533, at *10. To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, "an
employee must show that he: (1) is a member of a protected class; (2) applied for the promotion; (3)
was qualified for the promotion; and (4) lost the promotion to persons who were not members of the
protected class." Id. (citing Cardenas v. AT&T Corp., 245 F.3d 994, 998 (8th Cir. 2001)).
106. Id. at *11. Therefore, because of the inference, Owens & Minor's motion for summary judgment
was denied for the claim of retaliation. Id.
107. Id. at *9-10. The arbitrator need only have "arguably construed and applied the CBA." Id. at *10
(emphasis added).
108. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
110. See Tewolde, 2009 WL 1653533, at *9
Ill. See generally, id. at * I -*7.
112. Id. at *2.
113. See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Cf. Wright v. Universal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525
U.S. 70, 80 (1998) (finding arbitration agreement that called for arbitration for "matters in dispute"
was less than explicit).
114. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1468 (2009) (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 22 (1991)).
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wolde erroneously assumed that Penn Plaza disposed of Gardner-Denver entirely,
instead of merely narrowing the Court's holding.
Additionally, because of the Supreme Court's holding in Penn Plaza and its
narrowed-but-still-valid holding in Gardner-Denver, the court in Tewolde was
incorrect when it noted that it was an open question within the Eighth Circuit as to
whether earlier arbitration of contractual issues in a CBA precludes a later civil
claim of the same facts under statutory discrimination laws." 5  The Court in
Gardner-Denver and Penn Plaza clearly spoke to this issue, and therefore the
Supreme Court's interpretation must control." 6
Likewise, the Court's recent decision in Penn Plaza left many questions un-
answered and failed to allay an employee's fear of future discrimination when it
broadly stated that arbitration will adequately protect an employee's statutory
rights and that arbitration should not be looked upon suspiciously." 7 Even though
the Court was justified when it stated that suspicion should not inhibit the further
development of arbitration, and despite the Court's generalized dismissal of arbi-
tration criticism," 8 further suspicions still remain for the use of arbitration for
statutory discrimination claims.
The Court attempted to play down the significance of the loss of a judicial fo-
rum by stating that a union's decision to arbitrate statutory claims is "no different
from . .. other decisions made by parties in designing grievance machinery."" 9
However, the Court failed to see that agreeing to waive employees' statutory right
to a judicial forum under Title VII is inherently different from any other provision
within the grievance machinery.
Unlike other contractual provisions which affect a group of employees, such
as "no-strike clauses," Title VII rights have always been seen as personal. 2 0 Fur-
thermore, unlike these other collective provisions, a union is much more likely not
to vigorously assert-and may sometimes even ignore-an individual's claim of
discrimination under Title VII because the goal of a union is to maximize com-
pensation for all, not just for a single employee.121 A union may forfeit an indi-
vidual's discrimination claim if the resources needed to arbitrate the claim could
instead obtain increased benefits for the whole.122 Further, if a union does fail to
115. Tewolde, 2009 WL 1653533 at *7.
116. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1468-69; Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47
(1974).
117. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1470, 73.
118. Id.; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985).
119. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1464.
120. See Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 44; Dillaway v. Ferrante, No. Civ. 02-715 (JRT/JSM), 2003
WL 23109696, at *7 n.6 (D. Minn. Dec. 9, 2003) ("Employees may waive some rights through the
collective bargaining process, but only those rights considered collective, such as the right to strike.");
Stephen A. Plass, Arbitrating, Waiving and Deferring Title VII Claims, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 779, 793
(1992).
121. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 669 (1987), superseded by statute, 28 U.S.C.
1468 (2006), as recognized in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369, 369, 382-383
(2004); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 742 (1981); Plass, supra note
120, at 814.
122. Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 742.
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vigorously assert an employee's statutory claim, proving that a union failed in its
duty of fair representation is very difficult to establish.123
The Court in Penn Plaza dismissed this argument by finding that individual
employees have an alternative to arbitrating a statutory claim through the union:
file a claim with the EEOC and have it sue the employer on the individual's be-
half.124 However, it does not take much before one sees the trouble with this "al-
ternative." Despite its optimism, the Court failed to see that the EEOC rarely-if
ever-files suit on behalf of individuals.125
For example, during the 2000 fiscal year, 79,896 claims were filed with the
EEOC.'26 Even though the EEOC found merit in 8,248 of these claims, it filed
291 lawsuits or intervened in 111 others a miniscule percentage of 0.5% of all of
the claims and five percent of those found to have merit.127 Further, a total of
21,032 employment discrimination suits were filed during this same period, mak-
ing the EEOC a party in only two percent of all employment discrimination
claims.128 This hardly is an adequate alternative.
With the limited resources of the EEOC,129 it is virtually impossible for indi-
viduals, whose claims are precluded by prior arbitration decisions, to have suits
filed on their behalf by the EEOC. Therefore, those individuals whose unions had
failed to arbitrate their claim, and who failed to win the EEOC lottery, are left out
in the cold with nothing but perhaps a "right to sue" letter from the EEOC.1o This
is of no use when individuals are precluded from the judicial system and are left
with no remedy for their discrimination. This is hardly the outcome Congress
sought when it passed the Civil Rights Acts of 1964 and 1991.131
Suspicion is further raised by the manual the arbitrator in Gilmer used, which
stated that "[a]rbitrators are not strictly bound by case precedent or statutory law.
Rather, arbitrators are guided in their analysis by the underlying policies of the
law and are given wide latitude in interpreting legal concepts."' 3  This clearly
supports the Supreme Court's earlier suspicion of arbitrators as deciders of statu-
123. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 58 n.19; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 742 (finding that unions fail to
adequately arbitrate claims for a variety of reasons without breaching their duty of fair representation).
124. 14 Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct. at 1473.
125. EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 290 (2002).
126. Id.; Richard T. Seymout, Recent Developments in Arbitration, SJ037 ALl-ABA 739, 748 (2003).
127. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 290. Moreover, during a nine month period spanning October 2004 to
June 2005, the EEOC filed suit only 144 times out of over 56,000 charges filed; a percentage of less
than 0.3%. EEOC: Nine Month Report Shows 'Significant' Drop in Discrimination Charges Filed With
EEOC, 169 Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA), at A-6 (Sept. 1, 2005). The fact that the EEOC filed suit only 144
times was especially significant given the fact that it had only filed suit 123 times a year earlier. Id.
Even with this "increase," it furthers the point that the percentage of all discrimination suits filed by
the EEOC remains miniscule. Even with the increase in suits brought in 2004-2005 to 144, the percen-
tage of suits filed out of the total number of meritorious claims actually decreased from 0.5% in 2000
to 0.3% in 2004-2005.
128. Waffle House, 534 U.S. at 290.
129. See Seymout, supra note 126, at 748.
130. A "right to sue" letter is "a notice ... issued in accordance with the law which gives the charging
party 90 days in which to file a lawsuit on his or her own behalf." U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC's CHARGE PROCESSING PROCEDURES,
http://archive.eeoc.gov/charge/overview-charge.-processing.html (last visited Mar. 16, 2010).
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (2006); § 1981a(c) (2006).
132. Howard, supra note 2, at 275 (quoting SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION,
THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL 26 (1992)).
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tory claims,133 when it found that arbitrators deal with "the law of the shop, not the
law of the land."l 34
Moreover, allowing an arbitrator to ignore statutory law undermines the
Court's proposition that employees are not waiving their substantive right to be
free from discrimination, but are merely agreeing to a different forum.3 s Even
though such language may not be in every arbitrator's manual and may not direct-
ly lead to a waiver of an employee's statutory rights under Title VII, it plainly
leaves the door open for such substantive waivers to occur when an arbitrator is
given the authority to blatantly disregard precedent or statutory law for broad
policy-based determinations.
No employer will be deterred from engaging in discrimination under a system
that allows for broad arbitral discretion and ignores adherence to the rule of
law.1 36 Employers could begin to justify their current discriminatory conduct by
rationalizing that the circumstances are somehow different from past conduct,
something that would be more difficult to accomplish under a system that adheres
more to precedent and bright-line rules. Likewise, if an arbitrator did ignore the
rule of law, it is extremely difficult to have that arbitrator's decision overturned by
an appellate court, in that a decision will generally only be overturned under very
limited circumstances.137
133. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743 (1981). See Bernhardt v.
Polygraphic Co. of Am., 350 U.S. 198, 203 (1956) ("The nature of the tribunal where suits are tried is
an important part of the parcel of rights behind a cause of action. The change from a court of law to an
arbitration panel may make a radical difference in ultimate result."); United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Enter. Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 598 (1960) ("Arbitrators have no obligation to the court to
give their reasons for an award."); McDonald v. City of West Branch., 466 U.S. 284, 290-91 (1984)
("[The] decisions in Barrentine and Gardner-Denver compel the conclusion that [arbitration] cannot
provide an adequate substitute for a judicial proceeding in protecting the federal statutory and constitu-
tional rights that § 1983 is designed to safeguard. As a result, according preclusive effect to an arbitra-
tion award in a subsequent § 1983 action would undermine that statute's efficacy in protecting federal
rights."); Shulman, supra note 44.
134. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 57 (1974) (citing United Steelworkers of Am. v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-83 (1960)).
135. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S 20, 26 (1991); 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1465.
1469 (2009).
136. Moreover, "[A]rbitration is like Christmas for [employers]" in that they "stack the deck in their
favor" when they develop arbitration rules and agreements. Seymout, supra note 127 at 749. Likewise,
many employers see arbitration agreements as "an effective forum-shifting device to remove the vast
majority of discrimination suits from potential runaway juries, to arbitrators." MERRICK T. ROSSEIN, I
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION § 13:21 n.2 (7th ed. 2007).
137. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006); see also Hall Street Assoc. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584 (2008)
(holding that §§ 10 and II provide the exclusive regimes for review under the FAA, but stricter re-
view may be implemented under state statutory or common law). In the Eighth Circuit, an arbitrator's
award may be subject to two additional hurdles on review. "First, an arbitrator's award can be vacated
if it is completely irrational, meaning it fails to draw its essence from the agreement. . . . The second
judicially created standard for vacating an arbitration award is when the award evidence[s] a manifest
disregard for the law." Williams v. Nat'l Football League, 582 F.3d 863, 883 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Schoch v. InfoUSA, Inc., 341 F.3d 785, 788 (8th Cir. 2003)). Even though Williams wsa decided after
Hall Street, Williams oddly enough makes no mention of Hall Street or the fact that Hall Street ruled
that manifest deisregard may not be a separate level of review. "Maybe the term 'manifest disregard'
was meant to name a new ground for review, but maybe it merely referred to the § 10 grounds collec-
tively, rather than adding to them." Hall Street, 552 U.S. at 585.
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Further suspicion is the result of a study done by the General Accounting Of-
fice (GAO) in 1994, which found that the vast majority of arbitrators were, on
average, sixty-year-old, highly educated white males.138 Such uniformity goes
against the statutory provisions put in place to ensure that jurors in federal court
are selected "at random from a fair cross section of the community."l39 Such sa-
feguards seek to ensure that one has the right to an impartial finder of fact, some-
thing that may be difficult to find in the arbitral forum.
In the Supreme Court's race to support the expansion of arbitration, specifi-
cally over statutory claims, it is blinding itself to the effect that closing the door to
a judicial forum has over these individual claimants. It appears that the Court, in
the spirit of disregarding the "unwarranted suspicions"'" of the past, is all too
willing to ignore the prospect that an individual may be left without an adequate
remedy. If courts continue to expand the ability of a third party to waive an indi-
vidual's right to a judicial forum and ignore the prospect that insufficient alterna-
tives may leave an individual locked out of a judicial forum, then perhaps the
individual is waiving more than the forum, but the right to be free of statutorily
proscribed discrimination.
VI. CONCLUSION
The ruling in Tewolde creates a concern that future courts may see this deci-
sion as justification to find that an employee's right to a judicial forum may be
waived, even when the language in the CBA purporting to support that conclusion
is less than explicit. This is particularly worrisome after Penn Plaza, as a third
party, such as a union, may now waive the right of one of its members to sue in a
judicial forum.
It is further concerning that courts will continue to uphold the waiver of indi-
vidual rights while ignoring the fact that those rights may be supplanted by the
collective interests of a union. Additionally, courts may continue to ignore the
fact that an individual is left with virtually no alternative remedy if a union refuses
to adequately arbitrate a claim. If arbitrators continue to have the ability, such as
in Gilmer, to ignore precedent and statutory law in favor of the circumstances,
then individuals will involuntarily have their substantive right to be free of dis-
crimination waived by a third party in favor of efficiency and cost-effectiveness.
MATTHEW GIERSE
138. Howard, supra note 2, at 276 (citing UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT,
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: How REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION DIsPUTES, GAOIHEHS-94-17 (March 1994)). "[1O]f the 50,000 neutrals on American
Arbitration Association panels, only 6% are women and of members of the National Academy of
Arbitrators (consisting of only labor arbitrators), an estimated 7% are women." Id. (citing Dorissa
Bolinski & David Singer, Why Are So Few Women in the ADR Field?, 48 ARB. J. 61, 61 (1993)).
139. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006); see also Howard, supra note 2, at 276.
140. These "suspicions" merely resulted in an arbitrator's decision being used as evidence in a judi-
cial forum, not prohibiting access to the judicial forum. Even with these "suspicions," parties would
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